We explore the idea of getting at the logical constants, or
at least the constants, of a language by 'extracting' them from a
given consequence relation, taken as primitive. Under minimal
assumptions, we show that (a) this gives the expected constants for
familiar consequence relations in logic, and (b) the extraction
operation is an inverse, in a suitable sense, to the Bolzano-Tarski
style method of defining a consequence relation from any set of
symbols taken as constants. This is joint work with Denis Bonnay.
Omega-rule was introduced by W. Buchhlolz to give a proof-theoretic analysis of \Pi-1-1-comprehension. The rule is used to expand second order existential introduction rule into an infinite figure. However Buchholz's cut-elimination theorem is restricted to derivations with an arithmetical end-sequent. We describe a version of this approach which works for arbitrary sequents.
Part I surveyed a variety of recursive ordinal notation systems and their relationships that have been used in proof theory, including those built up from below and applied in predicative and metapredicative proof theory, as well as those generated from above and that have been applied to the proof theory of impredicative formal systems. The latter ordinal notations make prima facie essential use of names of uncountable regular ordinals and require collapsing arguments to identify them with countable ordinals.
In this continuation, I describe another approach not requiring either uncountable ordinals or collapsing arguments but using finite and transfinite types over the countable ordinals. This approach takes one a certain distance into impredicative proof theory. Though some 40 years old, it has hardly been exploited and deserves renewed consideration.
We will review the 2009 JSL paper by Avigad and Towsner
giving a new functional interpretation of ID1, the theory of
arithmetic extended with one positive inductive definition. We will
outline the steps of interpretations in the paper, and then focus our
attention on the functional translation itself.
The importance of modeling reasoning agents in economics is
widely recognized by economists. However, the treatment of such
reasoning has evolved in a particular manner due to the particular
questions economists study and the evolution of the field. In this
talk I will provide an overview of the evolution of modeling economic
agents' reasoning. The talk will cover reasoning in microeconomics
prior to the widespread use of game theory, the evolution of reasoning
in game theory, when and how the two merged and how research on
reasoning agents advanced since. I will attempt to explain the forces
driving the particular evolution of modeling reasoning agents and
distinguish between some idiosyncrasies that are essential to
economics and those that beg modification and present research
opportunities.
I will present a simpler and cleaner version of a proof (c.
1960) of the termination of the epsilon substitution method for
first-order arithmetic.