Mathematical Logic Seminar Abstracts Winter 2011

Dag Westerstâhl (Gothenburg)

Grigori Mints (Stanford)

Solomon Feferman (Stanford)

Ulrik Buchholtz (Stanford)

Yossi Feinberg (Stanford)

William Tait (Chicago)

Peter Hawke (Stanford)

Zavain Dar (Stanford)
We take one step back from previous weeks and review two foundational papers at the intersection of Logic, Game Theory, and Economics. We cover Aumann's "Interactive Epistemology I: Knowledge", and his "Interactive Epistemology II: Probability". The main focus will be on working through Aumann's chief considerations when examining the relationships between the "semantic" and "syntactic" formalisms for modeling agents' knowledge and beliefs.

Grigori Mints (Stanford)
Many expositions of set-theoretic proofs involving forcing use non-classical (Boolean-valued, modal, intuitionistic) logic. We intend to study manageable (preferably decidable) theories that can be useful in this connection. Possible topics of talks next quarter and related literature will be listed.